>that doesn't mean reality exists
outside of my own experience.
I am aware of phenomenology and I've read some Merleau-Ponty. To my taste, however, the situation where an objective/"objective" scientific truth makes consistent predictions about my sensory experiences that suggest a physical outside world and another where that truth makes consistent predictions about the outside world itself, which in turn causes the sensory experiences, don't seem different in a meaningful way. Why make that distinction?
I mean yeah if you don't care about understanding the nature of existence, the distinction doesn't matter. If all you're concerned with is making useful predictions, there is no point in quibbling about the subjectivity of experience.
My point is simply that just because the scientific method leads to useful predictions that doesn't make it objective truth nor does it invalidate the importance of subjective experience.
>if you don't care about
understanding the nature of
existence, the distinction doesn't
matter
Okay, I think I understand your position now. (Though I'm not sure if the lack of belief in objective truth is as common as you claim.) Sorry be so persistent but I have to ask: suppose you do care about the nature of existence; how do you tell if it's one or the other or which one is more likely?
I'm not sure how to answer that. What is the purpose of determining which one is more likely? I don't think that's a question that's possible to answer nor one that reveals anything about the nature of existence.
I am aware of phenomenology and I've read some Merleau-Ponty. To my taste, however, the situation where an objective/"objective" scientific truth makes consistent predictions about my sensory experiences that suggest a physical outside world and another where that truth makes consistent predictions about the outside world itself, which in turn causes the sensory experiences, don't seem different in a meaningful way. Why make that distinction?