yes sorry, just updated my comment shortly before you replied.
This is CVE-2025-36911, the other ones were CVE-2025-20700, CVE-2025-20701, CVE-2025-20702. Coincidentally a similar set of headphones affected.
This one also has a pairing vulnerability, but I assume fast pair is on the BLE level:
> To start the Fast Pair procedure, a Seeker (a phone) sends a message to the Provider (an accessory) indicating that it wants to pair.
> [...] allowing unauthorised devices to start the pairing process [...]
It's a pity that this is only awarded with $15k, this is a really bad vulnerability - which clearly required thoughtful investigation, publishing, reporting, ... and would have a much bigger audience in the exploit market.
Would it be be trivial to have a init container to do CA injection? Maybe though mutating admission controller? Then some CNI magic to redirect outbound traffic to do transparent proxying?
Just because you cannot see how a vulnerability can be exploited does not mean that others can. As you describe, people seem to assume that the only way the config file ends up on the server is «physically» editing it.
An anecdote: I have been struggling with exploiting a product that relies on MongoDb, I can replace the configuration file, but gaining RCE is not supported «functionality» in the embedded version as the __exec option came in a newer version.
Is it too late to pull the plug on this menace?
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