Paper income tax rates are completely and utterly meaningless. Bringing them up is just muddying the waters. Effective rates on total income (including from capital, wealth taxes etc.), post-loopholes, are the only thing that matters.
The DSA is decades overdue. It's absurd that there hasn't been one. There's also a dozen non-EU countries that have one, and that number has been growing rapidly.
To call it a "negotiation tool" is like calling literally any import tax or tariff - of which hundreds of thousands existed and were entirely accepted as squarely in the Overton Window long before Trump took office - purely a "negotiation tool". Just because it's new doesn't make it one any more so than such import taxes which have been around for ages.
> There's also a dozen non-EU countries that have one, and that number has been growing rapidly
Not really. Most of them offer significant carve-outs for American BigTech companies, or their implementation has been stayed, or significant capex subsidizes are provided to help reduce their impact for American BigTechs considering FDI in those countries.
It has been a DNC supported policy [0] as well to put pressure on countries that are even considering a digital services act. Heck the Biden admin began the process of making a legal example out of Canada [1] as a warning shot to other countries considering such options.
> To call it a "negotiation tool" is like calling literally any import tax or tariff ... purely a "negotiation tool".
That is what import taxes and tariffs are when not clubbed with subsidizes and formal sector specific industrial policy, because the act of giving MFN status to certain nations is itself a negotiating tactic. Canada's backing down on a digital service tax is a good example of that [2]
The whole point of (eg.) giving the UK preferential market access to the US over the EU, and giving Japan and South Korea preferential market access to the US over China is because it is a lever we can use when negotiating. Heck, France and Germany have both constantly tried leveraging tariffs and import taxes as a negotiating tactic against the US under the Biden admin [3][4] (and of course earlier).
As I mentioned above, this has been a slow-rolling negotiation between the US and EU since 2019. We in the US have bipartisan support to oppose the DSA and DSA-equivalents abroad. It was prominent stance in the Biden administration [0], and even Harris would have put a similar degree of pressure on the EU.
We have no obligation to give Europeans a red carpet, and you guys are not in a position to push back anyhow. The Chinese [5] and Russians have given similar ultimatums to the EU as well. What are you going to do? Sign an FTA with India and then face the same problem in 10 years with them?
You guys have fallen into the same trap that the Mughal and Qing Empires fell into in the 18th-19th century. Anyhow, we've unofficially signalled we are leaving the responsibility of Europe's defenses to Europe by 2027 [6] - meaning member states have no choice but to end up buying American gear or completely vacillate to Russia on Ukraine.
You're still not explaining how the DSA is supposedly a negotiating tactic from the EU any more than you could say that about GDPR. It's a new legal framewo tackling a relatively new set of problems. If any of them get watered down because of deals with the US, then you could make that sort of claim.
> Anyhow, we've unofficially signalled we are leaving the responsibility of Europe's defenses to Europe by 2027 [6] - meaning member states have no choice but to end up buying American gear or completely vacillate to Russia on Ukraine.
Or just buying from the existing European providers? Most American gear has a (sometimes better, cf. all the stuff even the US buys from European companies) European based equivalent. The only major exception is the F-35, but at least one 6th gen European jet is in the works, and unless fighting with the US, an 5th gen stealth fighter isn't really that needed. European manufacturers need to increase output, and they have been working on it and have done so quite a lot already.
> Or just buying from the existing European providers? Most American gear has a (sometimes better, cf. all the stuff even the US buys from European companies) European based equivalent.
That might happen over the long term (I still have doubts given that whenever a joint EU project is formed between two countries with vendors, they inevitabely end up collapsing due to domestic political considerations such as the European MBT and FCAS - no leader wants to be the leader who shut down a factory with 1200 high paying unionized jobs for the greater good), but cannot happen in the 1 year timeframe given.
The reality is, if we the US make a deal with Russia over the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the next 12 months, the EU will have no choice but to accept it if you do not put boots on the ground and if you do not expropriate Russian government assets in the EU. But your leadership class has rejected [2] both [3].
> European manufacturers need to increase output, and they have been working on it and have done so quite a lot already.
Not enough for the 1 year time frame needed
> how the DSA is supposedly a negotiating tactic from the EU any more than you could say that about GDPR
We view the DSA as a non-tariff barrier to American services companies. This is both a Trump admin view [0] as well as a Biden-era admin view [1].
We held similarly negative views about the GDPR until Ireland, Czechia, Poland, and Luxembourg accommodated us by hiring our lobbyists as their commissioners.
And this is why every single pan-EU project fails - every major country like the US (previously listed) and China [4][5] cultivated economic and political ties with members that act as vetos in decisions that have a unanimity requirements.
This is why I gave the comparison to the Qing and Mughal Empire - the English, French, and other European nations broke both empires by leveraging one-sided economic deals with subnational units (eg. the Bengal Subah in the Mughal Empire and the unequal treaties in the Qing Empire), which slowly gnawed away at unity.
We in the US, China, Russia, India, and others are starting to do the same to you - not out of explicit strategy, but due to the return of multipolarity and most European state's failure to recover from the Eurozone crisis.
> whenever a joint EU project is formed between two countries with vendors, they inevitabely end up collapsing due to domestic political considerations such as the European MBT and FCAS - no leader wants to be the leader who shut down a factory with 1200 high paying unionized jobs for the greater good
Eurofighter Typhoon and before that the Panavia Tornado. That lineage's next up is the GCAP 6th gen plane.
Horizon/Orizonte and after that the FREMM (which is so good even the US are buying it). In general Italian/French naval cooperation is very strong.
The whole of MBDA and hell even Airbus were created for inter-country cooperation.
There are plenty of successful examples on which to build on, as well as failures from which to learn. But again, today very few military things cannot be sourced from a European supplier. BAE, Leonardo, Dassault, Thales, Rheinmetall, KNDS, Saab, Fincantieri, Naval Group, Indra, Airbus, MBDA etc. are world leaders in their respective fields.
> The reality is, if we the US make a deal with Russia over the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the next 12 months, the EU will have no choice but to accept it if you do not put boots on the ground and if you do not expropriate Russian government assets in the EU
No? US can sign whatever bootlicking deal it wants with Russia, but it's up to Ukraine what happens actually. The EU will continue backing Ukraine. Boots on the ground are highly unlikely, but exploration of Russian assets is quite probable (opposition isn't massive, and as time goes on, will only whither).
> We view the DSA as a non-tariff barrier to American services companies. This is both a Trump admin view [0] as well as a Biden-era admin view [1].
Cool, nobody cares. The US has put in sufficient actual tariffs that it cannot scream "unfair". EU leaders will try to negotiate whatever they can to lower short term economic damage, but the long term damage is done. The US is not a reliable trade or anything partner, and there's no going back on that.
Regarding your Mughal and Qing comparisons... Damn, where do I even start? EU isn't a country, so the comparison is off from the start.
How? Ukraine uses American intel for targeting, a significant amount of American munitions either bought directly from the US or indirectly by member states, and more critically, we in the US can force Ukraine to the table by preventing access to these systems.
> but exploration of Russian assets is quite probable (opposition isn't massive...
How? Belgium has vetoed expropriating Russian assets [0] because the ECB rejected providing a backstop. And Hungary has vetoed the utilization of Eurobonds [1]
If EU member states cannot expropriate Russian assets nor provide boots on the ground in Ukraine nor provide munitions and intel to replace American offerings in the next 1 year, what else is there that the EU can do?
On top of that, we've given the 2027 deadline for NATO, so now what should the EU prioritize?
> That lineage's next up is the GCAP 6th gen plane
Which isn't really an EU project - it's a Leonardo SA - Mitsubishi project as Leonardo is dual British-Italian. And that's my point. No EU joint defense project succeeds because inevitably individual states in the EU protect their champions
> The US is not a reliable trade or anything partner, and there's no going back on that.
Yep. And who else is there? The Chinese gave the exact same ultimatum as the US to European leadership, and so are the Indians as part of the FTA negotiation.
And we can always put the squeeze on Volkswagen, Mercedes-Benz, and LVMH and make both Germany and France squeal [2] and blunt any regulations coming out of the EU as a result - just like the China [3] and India [4].
> are world leaders in their respective fields
They absolutely are in R&D and IP, but their production will not scale out until 2029-35, at which point it would be too late.
They have been cut off already. But if you think that Ukraine was flying blind until now if not for US targeting, I don't know what to tell you.
> Which isn't really an EU project - it's a Leonardo SA - Mitsubishi project as Leonardo is dual British-Italian
No, Leonardo is Italian with significant presence in the UK. But in any case the British component is provided by BAE Systems (which also heavily participate in F-35). And yes, it's not an EU project, it's a project in which European countries and companies are taking part. Does that change anything?
> Which isn't really an EU project - it's a Leonardo SA - Mitsubishi project as Leonardo is dual British-Italian. And that's my point
> No EU joint defense project succeeds because inevitably individual states in the EU protect their champions
Do I need to list the big successes again? This is categorically not true.
> How? Belgium has vetoed expropriating Russian assets [0] because the ECB rejected providing a backstop. And Hungary has vetoed the utilization of Eurobonds [1]
Belgium can be convinced potentially, and with any luck Orban would be heading to prison next year, so Hungary wouldn't be vetoing Eurobonds.
> The Chinese gave the exact same ultimatum as the US to European leadership, and so are the Indians as part of the FTA negotiation.
What ultimatum? To drop DSA? Source?
> They absolutely are in R&D and IP, but their production will not scale out until 2029-35, at which point it would be too late.
Production of what? This is so industry and company specific that I struggle taking you seriously just throwing random years like that for everything. And in any case one the major weapon of the war is drones, for which manufacturing is mostly local in Ukraine. There are a million other things that go into a war machine, but pretending that the second US cuts supplies Ukraine has to surrender is disingenuous.
They cannot. The Belgian government has categorically rejected expropriation 3 days ago because the ECB rejected providing any funding, and Euroclear has announced it will fight the EU in Belgian court if any steps are taken to do so [2] with Belgian govenenent backing [4], so those funds would anyhow be frozen for years.
You aren't even reading any of my citations.
> Orban would be heading to prison next year, so Hungary wouldn't be vetoing Eurobonds
We still have Slovakia [3].
> What ultimatum? To drop DSA? Source
Over other regulations like CBAM [0]. The same way the US is playing hard ball over the DSA, China+India are playing hard ball over CBAM.
> Leonardo is Italian with significant presence in the UK
Yep, and as a result needs to continue to follow UK specific regulations and export controls [1], but being a single overarching conglomerate makes it significantly easier to manage the GCAP project, versus FCAS which became a Renault-Airbus spat which turned into a France-Germany spat.
> but pretending that the second US cuts supplies Ukraine has to surrender is disingenuous.
EU leadership has admitted this fact [5] and even best case projections [6] show it is a Herculean task in the next 1 year.
> Yep, and as a result needs to continue to follow UK specific regulations and export controls [1], but being a single overarching conglomerate makes it significantly easier to manage the GCAP project, versus FCAS which became a Renault-Airbus spat which turned into a France-Germany spat.
I have a hard time with you, you sound extremely confident in your opinions, provide sources and everything, and then make massive errors like saying no European common military projects work (after having been given a list of the big hits), confuse what Leonardo is and who is working on GCAP, and now you're confusing Renault (a car manufacturer that used to make planes a century ago, and that has recently said they'll look into making drones from underused factories) and Dassault Aviation.
To top it off, you cite sources that don't support your claims.
> Yep, and as a result needs to continue to follow UK specific regulations and export controls [1],
And cite a source that merely says "Requirement to rate each part number being exported from the UK in accordance with the UK Military Classification List;
" (emphasis mine).
> Over other regulations like CBAM [0]. The same way the US is playing hard ball over the DSA, China+India are playing hard ball over CBAM.
"Playing hardball" is not ultimatum. And your source doesn't even support your "hard ball" claim, it says India tried pushing back which was refused by the EU.
How what? How the EU will support Ukraine? The same way it currently has, and if things get dire, there will be more pressure to get alternative revenue streams (like convincing Belgium).
Or how there have been no ultimatums, and how EU legislations aren't negotiating tactics?
Maybe it’s stupid in your perspective. nevertheless; nations have the right to put laws in place and enterprises willing to provide goods and services ought to follow those rules.
And this is why the EU is stagnant and unable to innovate. These nations can do whatever they want but let's be honest about what's going on here. The law is stupid because it's forcing US tech companies to subsidize research boondoggles. They're providing bullshit jobs to useless academics who are incapable of doing any real work, and the final output will be some long reports that no one ever reads.
> And this is why the EU is stagnant and unable to innovate.
Can you help me understand how the EU is stagnant? Granted, they have lower economic growth than the US, but they're (mostly) not running large fiscal deficits.
And unable to innovate is quite simply, untrue. Deepmind (you know the people that invented LLMs) were a UK based company and were purchased by Google. Spotify & Skype were also both relatively innovative.
If by innovative, you mean are highly valued in the stock market above what a rational person would pay, then yeah Europe doesn't have as much "innovation". Now, if there was a single EU capital market (which honestly should be in London, despite the political complexities) then that might not be true.
Also worth noting that a lot of the US market is propped up by EU/EEA investors. Like, the Norwegian oil fund owns an appreciable amount of the US stock market. What would happen if all the European money was withdrawn from the US market? Nothing good for US "innovation".
And on the core point here, social media is now the public sphere, and as such is definitely worthy of investigation by academics. Like, if FB can do this (with much more personal data) then Twitter/X can do it. In fact, it would be super easy as they used to do it before Elon decided to attempt to monetise it badly.
Like, most studies of social media were performed on Twitter data, precisely because of this.
> Leaked documents 1
obtained by SOMO reveal how, under the pretext of the now-near-magical concept of ‘competitiveness’, these companies plotted to hijack democratically adopted EU laws and strip them of all meaningful provisions, including those on climate transition plans, civil liability, and the scope of supply chains. EU officials appear not to have known who they were up against.
I'm seeing the exact same narrative more and more right here on HN, in every thread in any way related to the EU - the idea that the likes of GDPR are destroying "competitiveness". That if only all of it would be axed, "competitiveness" would arise once more.
It's not a coincidence, especially with so much FAANG employees, either ex- or current, who spend even more on lobbying than the likes of Exxon highlighted in this article. Though it seems naive to blindly hope that even in the age of mass astroturfing, this place is somehow immune.
It's frightening just how similar the playbook and the players involved are, big oil and big tech being oh so alike.
It's happening on a different level as well. More and more developers are moving from the US to popular startup hubs in Europe, e.g. Amsterdam, Copenhagen. They were often higher up in the FAANG chain, so they are immediately quite high up where the arrive, and they are bringing the American culture with them. E.g. what do you mean you're taking a month of holiday, or what do you mean, you're staying at home with your wife to take care of your baby. And yes, you have a right to that, but it's different to take that time when you feel it's accepted or frowned upon.
It's just irrelevant and ignorant to bring up in the context of this article. These things aren't correlated. I can name countries where academic fraud (fake papers, fake data) is much more rampant than the US, yet faking a disability to get a single dorm room is unthinkable. You're oversimplifying things and making connections that aren't there.
As per the following discussions, I would say pointing this out is relevant. China has been a leader in this respect. The cultural trends have shifted, regardless of the specific mechanisms. I suspect the cause to be multidimensional. The erosion in confidence of both institutions and process, across the US and world, have contributed to an ends-justify-the-means philosophy. There's almost palpable economic strata that are increasingly difficult to ascend, causing a great deal of stress and pressure. Granted, foreign influence is probably far down the list.
I was pointing out how the "stereotype" fits, not that it has somehow corrupted higher education by exposure. I think there's a good comparison here, which is why it was initially mentioned.
No, just one of the 99% of universities in this world where people aren't en masse claiming to have disabilities for selfish gain. Neither long ago - this is as of 2025 - nor particularly far away.
> > we are concentrating all the wealth and power into the hands of a few.
> Correct, their slice of the pie is growing, the bottom 90%'s is shrinking
Not sure about "power" there. In my experience you get power by having a lot of free time and dedication to something else other people don't care about… which yes includes billionaires obviously, but most of the people meeting that description are just middle class retirees, so they're outnumbered.
> > This leaves the top 1% getting richer every year and the bottom 99% fighting over a smaller piece of the pie every year.
> Also correct, the biggest growth of share being in the top 1% segment.
It does not show it "every year", there are long periods of stagnation and some reversals. I would say it shows that recessions are bad and we should avoid having them.
nb another more innocuous explanation is: there's no reason to have a lot of wealth. To win at this game you need to hoard wealth, but most people are intentionally not even trying that. For instance, you could have a high income but spend it all on experiences or donate it all to charity.
Looks less "intelligent" to me, just a lot more trained on agentic (multi-turn tool) use so it greatly outperforms the others on the benches where that helps while lagging elsewhere. They also released bigger models, where "Pro" is supposedly competitive with 4.5 Sonnet. Lite is priced the same as 2.5 Flash, Pro as GPT 5.1. We'll definitely do some comparative testing on Nova 2 Lite vs 2.5 Flash, but not expecting much.
Claude 2.0 was laughably bad. I remember wondering why any investor would be funding them to compete against OpenAI. Today I cancelled my ChatGPT Pro because Claude Max does everything I need it to.
Sure, I meant the anglosphere. But in most countries, the less people are aware of technology or use the internet the less they are enthusiastic about AI.
I still don't see it. Look at some of the countries with the highest relatively high individual "personal tech usage" as well as "percentage of workers/economy connected to tech": South Korea, Israel, Japan, the US, UK, the Netherlands. The first three are on the positive end, the next two on the negative end, and the last one in the middle.
"Region of the world" correlation looks a lot stronger than that.
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